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Development cost is defined as the ratio of development
expenditures in a given year to reserves added in that year.
Changes in development cost are a good proxy for changes in
finding cost and in user cost, because discovery, development,
and postponement or holding of hydrocarbons in place, are three
competing forms of investment.
Popular definitions of "finding" cost are an illogical and
useless mixture of discovery and development.
Although the discovery of large oil fields peaked before
1930, oil reserves added by development increased then stabilized
around 1960. Costs tended if anything to decrease through 1972,
but the decrease was mostly a one-time gain through the retreat
from a costly regulatory scheme.
The first price explosion in 1974 saw a strong decline in
oil reserves added. The second price explosion was followed by
an increase, but the best performance since 1949-51 came in 1983-
85, when oil prices were declining by nearly one fourth in real
terms. High oil and gas prices promoted a drilling boom, which
raised factor prices and lowered efficiency. Old-field
development was therefore inhibited, but then helped as the boom
deflated. Therefore the effect of the steeper price decline of
1986-87 has been mitigated by the decline in cost.
3Finding and Developing Costs in the USA
Introduction The United States, excluding Alaska, is by
far the largest and most intensively explored and developed oil
province in the world. It is therefore the best place to study
the effects of diminishing returns over time in oil and natural
gas discovery and development.
Diminishing returns over time must be carefully
distinguished from diminishing returns at any given time. The
more wells to be drilled and reserves to be booked in a given
year, the farther down the list of projects the industry goes.
Moreover, haste makes waste. Therefore, under the conditions
ruling at any given time, the greater the discovery-development
effort, the less productive it is.
But over time, the largest fields would be found first even
by chance, not to mention design; the better the drilling
prospect, the earlier it is drilled. Hence over time there
should be a persistent shift toward fewer and poorer reservoirs.
The supply curve would move counter-clockwise, all else being
equal, and the price would rise. (Below, Figure 5)
In the United States, by the end of 1945, 1.3 million wells
had been dug, and 32 billion barrels produced.[API 1959] The
industry was far down the discovery curve. Of the largest 186
fields in the "lower 48" (i. e. excluding Alaska) known in 1985,
120 had been found before 1945, and they contained 76 percent of
4all the oil in the group. (Below, Fig. 1) In 1945, there were
only 20 billion barrels left in "proved recoverable reserves"
[API-AGA 1946]. Yet through 1985, the United States, excluding
Alaska, produced not 20 but 100 billion barrels.
It has been shown that reserves in known oil and gas fields
continue to grow for decades after supposed maturity. Moreover,
the growth of reserves in known fields in the USA after World War
II was about equally divided between higher recovery rates and
new oil in place [AHKZ 1983, ch. 6]. Proved reserves are only
the ready shelf inventory of the industry, which keeps
re-stocking the shelves by drawing from some undetermined amount
"out there".
Diminishing returns have been extensively analyzed by
estimating and projecting reserves and production. [For recent
surveys: see Meyer & Fleming 1985, Woods 1985] The best-known
example of the physical approach is that of M. King Hubbert. He
fitted a logistic curve to past production, and extrapolated it
to predict future production, on the principle that the area
under the ultimate curve was the original finite amount. After
the peak, production would turn downward at a rate which would
first accelerate, then flatten, converging toward zero.
Hubbert's prediction of 1970 as the peak production year was
correct, apparently the only good prediction known to students of
the oil industry. The objections of John M. Ryan, that the curve
5had no logical connection with the actual process of finding-de-
veloping-producing, seem never to have been much regarded. [Hub-
bert, 1962. Ryan, 1965]
U.S. oil production in the "lower 48" declined slightly for
a decade, but after mid-1980 remained quite steady. The industry
seemed to take an unconscionably long time dying. Perhaps the
higher prices were a reprieve, but there were also much higher
costs. The much lower prices of 1986 are perceived as promising
lower reserve-additions. The key is in the price-cost relation,
which the volumetric approach ignores.
The problem can be posed by taking successive snapshots OGJ




(disc. 1899) (disc. 1930)
End-1942 reserves: 54 2600
Cumulative production,
1943-86 736 3031
End-1986 reserves: 970 1200
In more recent experience: the Prudhoe Bay field was rated
for years at 9.6 billion barrels recoverable reserves. Early in
1987, it produced its 5-billionth barrel, leaving, one might
suppose, 4.6 billion. But this was becoming increasingly
doubtful because the expected decline in output was postponed
from year to year. In fact, an informed estimate shortly
6thereafter was of 8.2 billion, including 0.4 billion natural gas
liquids. Salomon 1987]
The additional barrels in large as in small fields were no
gift of nature, nor did they reflect any "conservatism" in the
original estimates. On the contrary, they were acquired by heavy
investment both tangible and intangible. Our objective is to
measure the relation between discovery-development investment and
reserve-additions since World War II.
Some costs and pseudo-costs Many cost figures are
mentioned these days, but usually the sources and methods are not
explained. Often there are obvious errors in one or both. For
example, "finding costs" are often used to designate the sum of
development and exploration outlays. [Andersen 1985] But this
adds apples to oranges, and it compounds the error to compare the
sum of the expenditures with the reserves described as "found"
during the year. The reserves discovered through the finding
effort of a given year will nearly all be booked in later years.
As for money spent for the acquisition of acreage, that is not a
cost at all, but a transfer payment.
Second, they add oil and gas, which have been subject to
different forces, and reacted differently. This multiplies the
effect of the first error. If Company A develops oil and B
explores for gas, we add their expenditures, divide by Company
7A's reserves-added, and are alarmed at the average "finding
cost". Each company knows better.
Third, the basic data are seriously biased downward. Thus a
compilation for 30 large companies, which account for about two-
thirds of liquids reserves [Picchi & Winnall, 1986] has them
replacing only 81 percent of their production in 1985, only 63
percent for 1978-85 inclusive. (We exclude purchases.) But the
corresponding Department of Energy totals for the whole industry
were 134 and 112 percent.
These and other errors which we cannot trace cumulate into
estimates of "finding cost" which are flights of fancy. The most
notorious though not the worst example was the damages award in
the Pennzoil-Texaco case. (We state no opinion on the legal
question at issue, whether there existed a valid binding Getty-
Pennzoil contract.) Pennzoil had paid about $3.40 per barrel for
Getty's oil reserves. It claimed that the replacement cost by
drilling would have been $10.87.1 One need not believe that
capital markets are perfect to see that such a 3:1 discrepancy
between market value and replacement cost is ridiculous. Even
more wild is an estimate submitted in October 1986 to the IPAA
(which, we stress, was not their work) that "replacement cost of
1 Thomas Petzinger Jr., "Texaco v. Pennzoil, Anatomy of a
Jury's Deliberations", Wall Street Journal, May 8, 1987, p. 7.
8crude oil was over $26.50 in 1984, but if one adds financing
costs the totals go much higher". [IPAA, 1986]
"Financing costs" are the cost of holding the asset oil-in-
ground until it is extracted. For this reason, as we show below,
oil at the wellhead has a cost or break-even price roughly three
times as much as the capital cost or value of oil-in-ground.
Hence this measure of so-called "finding cost" translates into a
wellhead cost of about $80. In fact, even $26.50 as the in-
ground cost is overstated by a factor of about six (below, Table
II).
A recent article [Desprairies, Boy de la Tour, Lacour 1985]
has some fairly elaborate cross classifications of reserves by
cost category, but provides no hint of sources or methods.
Moreover, a cost of $20 per barrel is said to be "compatible with
a market cost of around $30/barrel" p. 523], which sounds as
though there is some additional undisclosed element. This
mystery about the concept of cost makes it impossible to use.
Sometimes it is not even necessary to learn how an estimate
was made to see that it is impossible. For example, there have
been frequent references to an estimate that outside OPEC it
takes $70,000 to find and develop one additional daily barrel of
capacity. [OECD 1985, Ebinger 1985, Banks 1985] This is
presented as a worldwide parameter, to which the industry and its
customers must adapt.
9But a little mental arithmetic shows this estimate to be
impossible. In the United States, the cost of capital on equity
funds is about 10 percent real, i. e., assuming oil prices will
move with the general price level. A rough average decline rate
is around 12 percent (below, Table III). Assume 35 percent for
royalties, state taxes (not income taxes), and operating costs
(below, Table V). Spending $70,000 for a daily barrel only
makes sense if the price is at least $65 per barrel, and is
expected to rise with the rate of general inflation.2
During the delirium of 1979-81 many oilmen expected such
prices--some day. But it passes all credulity to suppose that
they have on average been spending this, year in year
out--without losing their shirts, their jobs, or their companies
to takeovers or stockholders' suits.
In 1985, a barrel of developed reserves in the ground sold
in the USA at $6 per barrel ([OGJ 1985c]). Now, $6 per barrel in
ground equates to $20,300 per initial daily barrel of capacity
(below, Equation [2]). Rational people will not spend the
equivalent of $70,000 for what they can reproduce for less than
one-third the amount.
The $70,000 per daily barrel delusion is a useful reminder.
A cost estimate needs to be validated by reference to the
relevant price. If it passes the test, it may still be wrong,
2 That is, ($70,000/365)*(.12+.10)/.65 = $64.91.
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but if costs are far above prices, the estimate must be rejected,
and the estimator must go back to the drawing board.
Theory
Costs are measured as an investment outlay versus (1) new
reserves in the ground, or (2) new productive capacity.
There is a basic relationship between (1) and (2). Proved
reserves are the amount which will ultimately be produced out of
a pool by the capacity of facilities in place. Hence if R =
reserves, Q = initial output, and a = the exponential decline
rate, then:
R = ofT Q e- at dt = Q/a * (1-e-aT) (la]
As T becomes large, R approaches Q/a, or a = Q/R. [1]
With normal pool lifetimes, the error in using infinite time
is usually but not always negligible. The depletion rate is only
an approximation to the true decline rate, and is subject to
biases up and down. (For a fuller discussion, see [AHKZ 1983,
Appendix B.])
In the United States, good data exist on annual increments
to proved reserves, and development costs can be calculated as
dollars per barrel added in the ground. But with Equation [1],
that figure can be translated into outlays per initial barrel of
capacity, and checked against independent data.
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For example, if K = investment, and K/R, the cost of
installing facilities which will enable us to book one barrel in
the ground, then the investment per additional daily barrel in
the US in recent years, when the decline rate a was about 0.12:
(T-->O0) K/Q = 365 (K/Ra) = 365K/.12 = 3042 K [2]
(T=25) K/Q = 365 (K/Ra)(1-e-aT ) = 365K/.113 = 3230K
Conversely, if we learn that the investment per daily barrel
is e. g. $20,000 per daily barrel, the investment per barrel in-
ground is about $20,000/3230K = $6.19.
Moreover, as indicated earlier, the producer needs to hold
the asset, as a stock of proved reserves, until he sells it off.
Thus the real supply price must allow for the ratio of
above-ground to in-ground values.
Defining K, a, R, T, and Q as before, we add i, the minimum
acceptable rate of return, and P as the market value.
Undiscounted value of in-ground reserves = PR = PQ/a
Discounted present value above ground =
PV = PQ f e-C+ l i)t dt = PQ/(a+i) = PR (a+i)/a [3]
Then in equilibrium the value of a discounted above-ground
unit relative to an undiscounted below-ground unit is
approximately (a+i)/a. What comes to the same thing, the cost of
holding the inventory below-ground until the time of production
is:
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(T-->0) (a+i)/a = 1 + (i/a) [4]
(T=25) ((a+i)/a) = (1-e-aT)/(1-e-( a+i )T) 4a]
Assuming R/Q = 12, i = 0.1, the cost of holding is 1.833
assuming infinite time, and 1.783 assuming 25 years.
Thus a barrel or mcf above ground is barely worth buying at
a price which is (l+(i/a)) times the price of a unit below
ground. Contrariwise, if a unit above ground cannot be expected
to sell for (l+(i/a)) times its cost to create under ground, then
it is not worth creating.
Obviously, the higher the discount rate, and the longer it
takes to get the oil or gas out of the ground (reciprocal of a),
the more expensive is the oil or gas. The faster the depletion,
and the shorter the holding time, the better--all else being
equal.
But faster depletion takes more investment. Hence the
optimum depletion rate is a tradeoff between higher investment
and quicker return. (Of course, the depletion rate may be
limited by government, or by some kind of monopoly arrangement
limiting investment and production.)
But, instead of depleting a pool faster and more expensively
to get more production, at some point it pays to incur the costs
of finding an additional pool. Thus development and exploration
are limited substitutes for each other. This is a hint that will
be followed up later.
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Data: expenditures and reserve additions
[TABLE I HERE]
Column 1 of Table I presents a series for converting nominal
into constant-dollar expenditures.3
In cols. 2 - 7, using column 1 as deflator, we show
expenditures made for finding and for developing, 1955-1986. The
Joint Association Survey is the source for 1955-72, the Census
Bureau for 1973-82. The estimates for 1983-86 are approximations
based on the J. A. S. drilling expenditures, since total explora-
tion or total development are no longer available from any
source.4
The expenditure series have been purged of lease bonuses or
lease rentals, which are not costs, but rather transfer payments,
that is, a share of past or expected profits, paid to the
landowners, chiefly the U. S. government.
The division of exploration expenditures between oil and gas
is proportional to the number of successful exploratory wells for
3 During 1963-85, this is the drilling cost index of the
Independent Petroleum Association of America [IPAA 1963-85].
During the years of overlap 1963-73, changes in the IPAA index
were very close to those in the GNP:IPD price index of "non-resi-
dential gross domestic business investment". The two diverged
sharply after 1973, an important fact to be discussed below. But
it enables the use of the "business investment" index as a proxy
for the IPAA index for years before 1963.
4In March 1986, the API resumed publication of a comparable
series, starting with the year 1983.
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each; total development expenditures are divided between oil and
gas in proportion to drilling expenditures respectively on
development oil wells and development gas wells.
[TABLE II HERE]
In Table II, the deflated expenditures of Table I are
divided by reserves-added, to obtain the cost per unit added.
The reserve additions were published for many years by the
American Petroleum Institute and American Gas Association.
[API-AGA, 1959-76; API-AGA & EIA 1977-79; EIA, 1980-86] They are
understated because of the omission of natural gas liquids,
which, following the EIA takeover of the reserve statistics, are
no longer compiled by origin. [EIA letter 1985] It is an
unfortunate gap, but with little effect on the observed trend.
Increments to gas reserves include only non-associated gas,
since we are trying to match them with drilling and equipping and
other expenditures on new gas wells. This again gives some
understatement because some part of the expenditures for crude
oil development is for the production of associated-dissolved
gas.
An alternative series shown below (Table IV, Figure 6) is
essentially a combined finding-developing cost per barrel.
(TABLE III HERE]
Table III shows some factors bearing upon cost changes: the
depletion rate, cumulative production, number of development
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wells drilled, and total drilling expenditures per rig year, a
rough indicator of efficiency.
The increase in drilling expenditures per rig year appears
to be an anomaly, given the efficiency increases that have
occurred in the industry since the post-1979 drilling boom.
Certainly the increase in the number of wells drilled per rig-
year acts to offset the rise in expenditures per rig-year, but a
decrease in expenditures would still have been expected, or at
least stability, not an increase. The explanation for this
result is derived, at least in part, from the fall in the
drilling price index (Table I) which offsets the drop in nominal
drilling expenditures.
It might at first appear that these reserve and expenditure
data were so highly aggregated as to be useless. After all, they
include a very large number of fields and reservoirs, and a wide
range of recorded costs. And it is true that if these data
aggregated the average or total lifetime cost of many reservoirs,
the result would not be interesting. But a single year's data
record incremental (not average) cost across all reservoirs
developed. The industry is a selective mechanism for maintaining
or expanding output at the least cost. Under competitive
conditions (which hold in the USA though not in the world
industry), marginal cost everywhere moves toward the expected
price. Lower-cost reservoirs are expanded to the point where
16
rising costs choke off additional drilling. Higher-cost reser-
voirs are drilled more selectively, to bring down incremental
costs, or are not drilled at all. The industry is forever
approaching the long-run equilibrium, which of course it never
attains. (The excluded transfer payments equalize private
marginal costs, not social costs.)
Of course, there is still a great variability among new
projects, some real and some artificial. On the low side: new
low-cost reservoirs are drilled up only gradually. Costs are
abnormally low at first, then rise as they approach marginal
equality. This biases the total down. Contrariwise, the early
stages of any project are outlays with nothing to show for them,
which biases the total expenditure up.
Indivisibilities are also a distortion. Incremental cost in
a pool may be below the price, but more intensive development
would require so large an additional investment, e.g. another
platform, that its cost would exceed the price. More generally,
too high a production rate will damage the reservoir and exact a
very high cost; best not to approach the edge of the cliff.
So far, reserves developed during the year have been
discussed. Oil in newly found fields and pools can only be
roughly estimated, as the AAPG does annually. [AAPG, annual].
For those years where they overlap, the AAPG estimates are below
the API, and I would consider them downward-biased. [Meyer 1985,
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p. 1953] Back-dated estimates made years later are much more
accurate.
No use is made here of the item "discoveries" in the API-AGA
or the current EIA publications. These "discoveries" include
only that small part of newly-found fields that has actually been
booked, i.e. developed and made ready for production in the given
year. The eventual reserve figure is several or many times the
initial estimate, with great variation among fields, regions, and
years. Hence the annual "discoveries" number is meaningless, a
fragment masquerading as data.
For the Province of Alberta in Canada, there are back-dated
discoveries, year by year, and by fields, since 1947. [Alberta
1984] [Uhler & Eglington 1986]. For the United States, similar
numbers by states (but not fields) are available from 1921
through 1979. After that year, the API-AGA statistics were
replaced by a Department of Energy series. Unfortunately, this
was based on a sample of operators not fields, and the back-dated
estimates could no longer be made. And since it takes about six
years to get a reliable estimate, the usable back-dated entries
end in 1973. A panel appointed by the National Academy of
Sciences has criticized this procedure NAS 1985], and pointed
out the statistical gap.
Since fields continued to grow after 1973, even the API-AGA
series is too low. Hence we cannot use it to calculate unit
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costs. Even if we did, since a biased series might be better
than none, a given year's "cost" would not be comparable with,
nor additive to, the same year's unit development cost. Below,
we will show how changes in development cost are a proxy for
changes in discovery costs; and how discovery values may be
estimated from reserve values and development costs.
Discussion: Graphic Summaries
Oil & Gas Discovery
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Figure 1 is based on the original reserves credited as of
the end of 1985 to 186 large fields which account for
approximately 50 percent of total U. S. reserves. The lower line
shows the percentage credited to fields found during the decade
ending in the year shown. Thus fields found before 1900 contain-
ed about 5 percent of the total, 1901-1910 discoveries about 7
percent, etc. Oil discoveries peak in the decade 1921-1930, with
about one-fourth of the total, after which the decline is rapid
to 1960 and thereafter.
The upper curve cumulates the decades. It shows, for
example, that about 80 percent of the oil in these large fields
discovered through 1985 was in fields discovered before 1945.
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[FIGURE 2 HERE]
Figure 2 shows the trends in backdated discoveries of oil
and gas in all fields, large and small, during 1920-1973. The
oil line checks approximately with the trends shown in Figure 1,
with the same peak before 1930, and the severe decline since.
The AAPG series (not shown) at least suffices to show there was
no reversal of the decline after 1973. Nonassociated gas
discoveries are dominated by the spike in 1922; another much
smaller peak is in 1951.
[FIGURES 3 & 4 HERE]
Figures 3 and 4 show 1955-86 expenditures on exploration and
development, for oil and gas, in current dollars and constant
dollars, respectively. 5 In oil, there was a slow decrease in
real expenditures through 1973, while gas shows a drop in the
later fifties, and a rough constancy afterward. Then comes the
big boom. Stated in real terms, oil development expenditures
decline sharply after 1955-56, while the other classes remain
stable.
s During 1955-1982; designating oil development wells as
OWLS, the cost index as IP, reported oil development expenditures
could be fairly well estimated by:
Expenditures ($billions)=$7.6*OWLSO.72 pIPl.03 [5]
The standard error of estimate is 8.6 percent.
Incidentally, the number of wells, and the IPAA
drilling-equipping cost index, are reported promptly. Using them
to estimate expenditures normally saves one to two years.
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Oil Development Costs
As stated earlier, diminishing returns in finding new fields
and pools are to be expected. Development investment would at
first seem to be an activity of gradually increasing efficiency
because of progress in technology. But this is only true ceteris
paribus, when considering a given operation, e. g. drilling to a
given depth in a given place. It is not true of the observed
development cost at any time.
If newer fields are getting smaller, deeper, more
heterogeneous and faulted, etc., then development cost per unit
of reserves booked in those new fields must also increase.6
Moreover, when it becomes increasingly difficult to find new
oil fields as good as those previously discovered, the
alternative of more intensive development in the old fields
becomes more attractive. Thus more development wells will be
drilled into and near the older pools.
Finally, the higher the cost of new oil, the greater the
incentive to drain the old oil faster, even at the cost of higher
investment requirements. As seen above, the higher expenditures
are to an important degree offset by the faster payout. Of
course, in each reservoir, a point is reached where faster
6 Suppose all pools to be at the same depth, circular, and
homogeneous. Then the total number of wells drilled will be
proportional to area. The number of dry holes will be
proportional to the circumference which they outline. The ratio
of circumference to area is 2/r, where r = radius, so the smaller
the area the higher the dry-hole ratio. Increasingly
heterogeneous reservoirs are in effect smaller circles, with
higher dry-hole ratios. Non-circular areas have a higher ratio
of circumference to area.
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depletion would be inordinately costly because it would damage
the reservoir.
Thus for three (not wholly independent) reasons, oil
development cost changes reflect discovery cost changes: as the
crop gets more scanty, more development effort is needed to
process it. Hence oil development costs are a proxy or indirect
indicator of changes in finding cost.
The general principle is: at the margin, another unit of
investment ought to bring the same return in development as in
exploration. With lower development cost ceteris paribus, the
shift toward development from exploration relieves the pressure
on exploration, and stops when marginal returns are again
equated.
It is natural to think of discovery and development as
complementary, and so they are in any given project. The higher
the expected finding cost, the lower must the development cost be
for the project to be acceptable. But outside of a relatively
small number of projects in the early stages, discovery and
development are overwhelmingly substitutes not complements.
A measure of changes in finding-developing-producing cost
The unit costs calculated above, dividing expenditures by
reserves-added, are deficient in that they must to some extent
reflect movements along the supply curve, when we are trying to
isolate the movement of the curve (see above, p. 1).
[FIGURE 5 HERE]
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In Figure 5, reserves-added are plotted on the horizontal
axis, price on the vertical. Each of the three observed points
represents the intersection of the year's supply curve with the
year's demand curve. The curve must pass through the origin,
since with a zero price there would be zero reserve-additions.
Dividing the Y-value (price) by the X-value (reserves added),
yields the average slope of the supply curve. Thus if the price
were $10 and 10 units were supplied (S1), then the slope would
equal unity. If, at the same $10 price, only 5 units are
supplied (S2), then the slope of the curve is 10/5 = 2. In
Figure 5, we have also drawn in a non-linear supply curve, which
seems more realistic. But even if we supposed that the shape
changed over the years, the increasing slope of the curve would
signal rising costs, even if we knew nothing about the slope of
any particular curve. Moreover, the supply price shown in Figure
7 includes discovery or in-ground value, development cost, and
current producing cost.
[TABLE IV; FIGURE 6 HERE]
Table IV, and Figure 6, show the slope of the price:
reserves-added relationship over a 55 year period. From 1918 to
1929, when discoveries were increasing, the slope decreased by a
factor of about 6, despite much fluctuation. Omitting the
depression outliers of 1930-37, when investment dwindled and
reserves-added went nearly to zero, a small net decrease is
apparent. For the next 36 years, when exploration dwindled
rapidly, the supply curve showed no leftward rotation.
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A similar price/reserves plot for natural gas is not
posssible, because the published "price" of natural gas is
merely the arithmetic average of all prices on old and new
contracts, inter-state and intra-state, in no way comparable
with current costs, hence with no meaning for supply. Of course
they were in any case distorted during the long period when gas
prices were under control--as, indeed, many still are--and were
forced artificially high or low.
[FIGURE 7 HERE]
Figure 7 shows, for the period since 1955, both measures of
the cost of oil, together with the development cost of gas. The
two oil measures move generally together, but the price of gas
shows little relation, until of course the 1970s.
Development Costs 1973-85
There was a sharp break with the past after 1972, and both
development costs and total costs increased very greatly, for
various reasons. Wells drilled rose by a factor of 3.25. The
demand for oil and gas drilling-equipping services greatly
exceeded supply, which could not be quickly expanded. Hence the
price of drilling-equipping services rose very sharply. But even
adjusted for factor price changes, the real cost approximately
doubled over that time, whether measured by outlays per reserve
barrel added, or by the price of oil related to reserve barrels.
Obviously, the services were used much less efficiently.
Anecdotal evidence abounds. It is all too credible that
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kickbacks inflated drilling costs 30 to 40 percent in some
instances. WSJ 1985] But my own conjecture is that the use of
untrained personnel, and the hoarding of men, materials, and
machines, were much more important. In any case, the return to
drilling investment had to be less, as the industry moved up the
short-run supply curve.
[FIGURE 8 HERE]
Figure 8 shows that during 1949-1968, although well depth
increased, the number of wells drilled per rig-year persistently
increased, showing increasing efficiency. During the next five
years, well depth continued to increase, and wells per rig year
decreased, indicating perhaps unchanged efficiency. But after
1973, although average depth decreased, wells drilled per
rig-year continued to decline, indicating a loss of efficiency,
until the startling reversal after 1981.
In an effort to separate well depth from intensity of use,
an ordinary least squares regression was done, with wells per rig
year as the dependent variable. The DOE revised well completion
series was used for 1973-85, and estimated back to 1967 by
applying the 1973-77 ratio of the DOE series to the API series
(1.055). The independent variables are (1) the ratio of active
rigs to all rigs, as tabulated starting 1967 by Reed Tool Co.,
and (2) the average depth of well. If WRY = Wells per Rig Year,
PAR = Percent of Active Rigs, and AWD = Average Well Depth, then
the estimating equation is:
WRY = 14.3-0.49(ln PAR)-1.32(ln AWD) [ 5 ]
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Thus for every additional percent of rig capacity utilized,
the number of wells per rig-year fell by 0.49 percent; for every
additional percent of average well depth, wells per rig-year
decreased 1.32 percent. The R2 was .78, F-statistic 32,
respective t-statistics 3.8, 4.9, 3.0. This looks robust, but
the extremely low Durbin-Watson (0.95) downgrades the signific-
ance. As usual, the small sample and much collinearity take
their toll. However, it seems clear that there has been a great
short-term gain in efficiency, which may have more than undone
the waste and misdirected effort of the 1970s.
One hesitates to credit a doubling of efficiency (wells or
footage drilled per rig year) in only the five years 1981-86.
The mix of wells, as between oil and gas, deep and shallow, etc.,
must have changed. But a special tabulation done at Baker
Hughes, which allows for these changes, shows an increase of over
70 percent. My own conjecture is that these gains were made
slowly and incrementally since 1973, but were masked by the gross
inefficiencies unleashed by the drilling boom. As activity
slumped after 1981, the gains quickly appeared. We should not,
therefore, expect to see them continue for long.
An attempted explanation. We now try to draw the threads
together, and first try to explain to some degree why costs were
stable or possibly even decreasing during 1955-72. It takes some
explaining because cumulative output went from 33.2 billion
barrels end-1946 to 103.4 end-1973. Proved reserves of 21.5
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billion at the end of 1946 were used up and replaced three times
over during the next 27 years, each replacement from fields
inferior to the previous.
An exogenous factor was the decline, after 1949, in the real
price of oil in the United States, following trends in the world
price, although it was always considerably higher.
Imports were subject to quotas, first informal, then
"voluntary", then mandatory. But I think it was well understood
by the late 1950s that further price increases would not be
tolerated, and might lead to loss of quota protection. Indeed,
the struggle over oil imports was never-ending. In 1969, the
Nixon Administration undertook a review of the whole import
question, by a task force under the general direction of George
P. Shultz, which favored abandonment. [Shultz et al 1970]
The import quota had sheltered a system of market demand
prorationing which restricted output, and favored small
unproductive wells. It was often profitable to drill many more
wells than needed to drain a reservoir optimally. The additional
wells brought no additional capacity, only increased production
"allowables". [Adelman 1964.]7
As the real price slowly declined, these wells were
curtailed. Moreover, poorer prospects were no longer drilled.
As Table III col. (5) shows, the number of oil development wells
fell drastically, from 29 thousand in 1955 to 9 thousand in
7 This paper received the accolade of its author being
denounced by name by the then Governor of Texas, Mr. John B. Con-
nally.
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1973. (Gas development wells actually rose.) By that time,
production was no longer restricted by market-demand proration-
ing.
[FIGURE 9 HERE]
The result was a one-time gain in efficiency, the precise
amount of which is impossible to measure. This must account for
some part of the substantial oil cost reduction during a period
of massive resource depletion. As Figure 9 shows, there was no
corresponding decline in gas costs.
But from 1973 through 1976, the oil industry reacted to the
increase in oil prices by bidding up factor prices even faster;
while real costs rose faster yet. It is a tribute to the power
of expectations, and of course a classic example of the
accelerator-multiplier principle.
By 1978, this had been largely corrected, and the price-cost
margin was again at about the 1973 level. But then came the even
larger price jump of 1979-81, and an even stronger industry
reaction. Nothing was too extravagant, since everyone knew that
the price of oil was going to $100 or $200 by the end of the
century. At the same time, gas price regulation had generated
excess demand, and focussed all of it upon a small number of
exempt sources of supply: recently or newly found gas, imports,
and deep gas whose price touched $9 per Mcf.
The bubbles began to burst after 1981, but the effect was
two sided. Footage drilled per rig year, for example, which had
fallen from 125 thousand in 1972 to 102 thousand in 1981, rose to
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over 200 thousand at the end of 1986, and was still rising in
early 1987. To be sure, such comparisons are always distorted by
the shift in the mix of wells, oil and gas, shallow and deep,
productive and dry.
In any case, the fall in factor prices was such that the
producer's real price of oil actually increased, while develop-
ment cost fell again. By 1984, it was at about the 1955-63
level. Despite the sharp decline in rigs running, there was only
a mild decrease in oil development wells drilled. The volume of
oil reserves-added in 1983-85 was a near-record for any three
years, exceeded in the lower 48 only in 1949-51.8 [API 1959, API
1979, EIA 1986] Cost inflation and inefficiency cut so sharply
into the incentive of higher prices, that it is hard to discern
the net effect of the price increase. Conversely, the price
decrease since 1981 has been buffered and offset by the decrease
in costs.
Multiple regression analysis is the standard way of sorting
out such effects, but the barriers are formidable. The obvious
candidates for independent variables are the number of oil
development wells and/or some other index of intensity of use, to
register the movement along the supply curve; cumulative
production, to register the depletion effect which displaces the
whole supply curve; and the depletion rate or production/reserve
ratio, which pertains to both kinds of effects. The higher the
8 Reserves-added in 1986 were less than half of the 1983-85
average, but more than the lows of 1977, 1979, or 1982, when real
(inflation adjusted) oil prices were higher.
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depletion rate, the greater the shift away from exploration and
toward development as a source of reserves. It was pointed out
earlier that these were substitutes, hence proxies, because the
more expensive it became to find new fields, the greater the
inducement to increase drilling in and around old fields, and
produce at higher depletion rates.
But all these variables are highly intercorrelated, and
each is serially correlated with itself. For the period before
1974, no regression showed any relation. The appearance of a
relation comes only when one includes the later years, which
makes the results unacceptable for any attempt to explain the
depletion effect upon costs. Possibly a much larger scale study,
combining time series with cross-sections by states, could fill
the gap.
[TABLE V HERE]
Regression study of reserves added Table V shows the
results of a somewhat different approach: explaining the changes
in annual crude oil reserves-added by cost and price factors.
Equations 5-7 and 12-14 show the explanatory variables as
the nominal price of crude oil, and the IPAA drilling cost
(factor price). In both the arithmetic and logarithmic version,
the factor price variable is stronger. Suppose that both
variables double. "Real price", as defined here, would be
unchanged. But since 2-1.2320.74 =0.71, reserves-added would
drop by 29 percent. Apparently, the drilling cost variable
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incorporates not only the effect of drilling cost, but also the
effect of lower efficiency, with which it is strongly correlated.
We must recognize an identification problem. Reserve--
increments (the dependent variable) have no effect on the price
of oil, nor on cumulative depletion. But they do have an effect
on the index of factor prices (IPAA). The greater the inputs
into oil development, the greater the reserve increments, and
also the greater the pressure on factor prices. This may be
tolerable because most inputs are on exploration and on gas
development. But to some extent it impairs the relationships
measured in Table V.
Equations 3-6 and 10-13 incorporate the effect of cumulative
production. Taken in isolation, Equations 3 and 10 have the
right sign and a good t-statistic. But when allowance is made
for the effect of prices and costs, the coefficients are small
and insignificant. The effect is complex. Cumulative depletion
registers cumulative learning. Hence the attempt to use a
quadratic function to capture also the ultimate resource-
exhaustion effect. But nothing can be observed.
We look now at the outstanding anomaly, the extraordinarily
bad performance of the mid-1970s, when a huge upsurge of
exploratory and development drilling coincided with a very low
level of reserves-added. There would be no mystery if the
drilling boom were exogenous, and simply imposed higher money and
real costs. But this is not so; the drilling upsurge was a
response to perceived profit opportunities. It is difficult to
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get inside the mystery because of the wide variation in oil
prices at any given moment. For many leases whose output was
under price control, further development drilling was
unprofitable. Yet for the whole producing system, the desired
level of drilling plainly exceeded what could be done.
Analysis is the more difficult because after 1973, averages
of price and cost become unreliable because of price regulation.
Moreover, the reserves-added data are also less reliable.
[FIGURES 10 & 11 HERE]
Figures 10 and 11 show another physical indicator of cost:
average daily output per oil well and per gas well. In oil,
there is a slow increase after 1958, peaking in 1973 and
declining thereafter, but still well above anything before 1967.
In gas, there was a persistent decline in California and Texas.
The increase in Louisiana reflects the growing importance of
offshore production. The Louisiana decline after 1974 shows a
substantial decline in efficiency, or increase in cost.
Finding Costs, Development Costs, and
Resource Values, 1970-1985
The value of any asset, in any industry, is equal to the
lesser of (a) the present discounted value of its future surplus
over operating costs, or (b) its replacement cost. This ratio
has become well known as "Tobin's Q". In a mining industry, as
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we have emphasized, replacement may be had by (bl) development or
(b2 ) exploration.
A developed or undeveloped barrel in the ground is an asset,
governed by the general rule. Value and replacement cost are
always gravitating toward each other. The higher the value, the
greater the finding incentive and investment. This drives up
the cost. Conversely, the higher the cost of finding, the
greater the value of a barrel already found.
In whatever industry, nothing is more difficult than
predicting future returns from holding an asset for later
sale. Yet owners must make the comparison with replacement cost
as best they can, and decide whether or not to invest or to
disinvest, i. e. sell off some of the asset.
When oil prices are under pressure, we hear ad nauseam about
the foolish oilmen who will sell off "the incremental barrel" at
anything over bare operating cost. In fact, they will do no such
thing, unless they think the whole industry is liquidating, and
prices will never recover. Otherwise they must take into account
the value of the asset they consume: reserves.
Prices soften or decline when they are too far above the
total of operating costs plus development cost plus the lesser of
resource value or marginal finding cost. We should not lose
sight of the fact that in the areas holding most of the world's
reserves, a price as low as $10 is still very high compared with
the sum of the three. Our current concern, however, is with the
United States.
33
We propose to show the relation by first estimating what
price above ground would barely compensate the investment
calculated here, and comparing this supply price with actual
above-ground prices.
[TABLE VI HERE]
Table VI shows oil and gas revenues during 1955-83, first
gross then net of operating costs, taxes, and royalties. The
ratio stayed within a narrow range of 35 to 37 percent before
1974, but then declined mildly as prices outran costs, and then
jumped with the imposition of the misnamed Windfall Profits Tax
in 1981.
We turn now to the comparison of in-ground values with
prices and costs. Published estimates of current values are
based on current sales of properties. The sample for any one
year is very small. The dispersion is great, since each sale is
a single payment for a bundle of oil, gas, and many special
features, good or bad. It becomes hard to discern the values of
the oil or gas reserves as such. Moreover, published results are
"oil equivalent barrels", mingling oil and gas together.
A recent paper [Adelman, DeSilva and Koehn 1987] tabulates
the individual company estimates issued by the John S. Herold
Company beginning 1946. They calculate the present value of the
proved reserves, expected to be depleted in some trajectory over
time, and discounted at what is considered an appropriate rate.
The Herold valuations are not market data. However, they
are themselves subject to a market process: the nearer they come
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to what investors consider reasonable, i.e. would pay or demand,
the more successful they are. The survival of the company for
this long a period indicates that they have been acceptably
close; and the Herold valuations are frequently referred to and
quoted in the financial press.
[TABLE VII HERE]
In Table VII, columns (1) and (2) shows the average wellhead
price of crude oil, and the price net of operating expenses,
royalties, State severance taxes and (in recent years) the
Windfall Profits Tax, which is an excise not a profits tax. For
1955-82, there are actual data on these deductions. Since as
shown in the previous table the dispersion about the period mean
is quite small, it seems safe to extend it forward and back.
Column (3) shows the annual average value of proved reserves
of crude oil in the United States. Outside this country, not
only are reserves calculated differently, but the risk and
discounting factors are different.
(FIGURES 12, 13, AND 14 HERE]
Figure 12 shows the salient values: prices, values and
costs over a 40-year period. Because there is such a violent
break at 1973, Figures 13 and 14 show the earlier and later
period separately. These figures are all in nominal (current)
dollars. In real (inflation-adjusted) terms, they all decreased
through 1973.
For many years, the industry has had a rule of thumb of in-
ground value as one-third of the wellhead price. It seems to be
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well supported. Figure 15 (lower line) shows value is mildly
below one-third before 1973, mildly higher afterward.
[FIGURE 15 HERE]
Column (4) of Table VII recapitulates the development cost
estimates from earlier tables. Column (5) adjusts it for tax
benefits which lowered the net cost to the investor, more
substantially before 1975, when percentage depletion was
repealed. Since value is also after tax, this is necessary to
make the cost comparable with the value. The average ratio of
value to post-tax cost over the whole period 1955-88 is 1.6.
(The only years with values below unity are, significantly,
during the very disturbed if profitable years since the first oil
shock.)
The excess over unity, stated in column (6), is equal to
user cost, the present value of future use. It is the pure
resource value sacrificed by choosing to develop today rather
than later. A developed reserve is worth the present value of
revenues less operating outlays, but an undeveloped reserve is
worth only revenues less the sum of operating outlays plus
development cost. Therefore, if one subtracts out development
cost per unit from reserve value, one has the pure resource value
of a unit in the ground. In equilibrium, user cost equals
discovery cost, and should indeed be regarded as a rough
estimate, especially when averaged over a period of years.
[FIGURE 16 HERE]
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Figure 16 shows user cost in 1955-86. In nominal terms it
was quite stable through 1973, and paralleled development cost.
This confirms what we concluded in reviewing the theory:
development cost and exploration cost move in parallel because
they are substitutes for each other. The years 1975-76-77, and
1982, showed negative user cost. I think it is significant that
these were all unusually bad years in terms of reserves-added.
Price expectations and asset values. In general, a long-
lived asset rises in price when the market expects an increase in
the prices of the goods in which the asset will be embedded
through future production. Hence asset price changes are a
leading indicator or forecaster of product price changes. There
was no indication of higher user cost, hence future higher
prices, before 1973, which suggests that there was no room for
higher prices within the framework of expected supply and demand.
Table VII permits us to restate equation [4]:
V = Pa/(a+i-g) [6]
where the net present value of a barrel in-ground is the net
price above-ground, discounted for the cost of holding the
undepleted portion over the remaining lifetime of the pool. In
equation [6], we have introduced a new parameter g, the rate at
which the price is expected to rise.
According to the well-known "Hotelling valuation principle"
(HVP) [Miller & Upton 1985], the price of a mineral is expected
to rise at the riskless interest rate, since at a lower rate the
owner of the deposit would be losing what he could earn by
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selling the mineral and investing the proceeds. But a given
percent rise in the price is equivalent to a decline in the
interest rate. Hence in equilibrium g = i. If so, Equation [6]
reduces to V = P, the value of the deposit equals the current
undiscounted price. The elegant simplicity of this principle is
attractive. But it is contradicted by the data of Table VII.
See Figure 15 again.
The HVP cannot work because the owner of the reserve cannot
in fact extract and sell it off entire. At most he can deplete a
minor fraction in any given year. The faster he depletes, the
higher the present value. This relation is embodied in the
reservoir engineer's "deferment factor", which is proportional to
the reserve-production ratio. The lower the deferment factor,
the higher the ratio of discounted to undiscounted value.
[Production Engineering Handbook 1987] But the lower the
deferment ratio, the higher the cost. Optimal depletion
therefore involves a tradeoff. We can see how the one-third rule
embodies this fact if in Equation [6] we set g to zero, and
assume that the decline rate and the discount are approximately
the same. In that case, V = P/2.
However, that is only a broad generalization approximately
true over a long period. As noted above, in-ground value is an
index of price expectations. If the net prices are expected to
rise in the future, the present value of a known deposit rises
immediately. Therefore an increase in the ratio of V to P
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signals an expected rise in price. Rearranging Equation [6] we
have:
g = i + a(l-(P/V)) [7]
We can make this calculation from the data in Table VII, and
the annual production:reserve ratio in Table III, by assuming the
real discount rate is 10 percent. It is shown in Figure 17.
[FIGURE 17 HERE]
We cannot claim accuracy for these estimates, since they are
very sensitive to the discount rate. However, it is easy to
substitute a better one; there is a one-to-one correspondence
between changes in i and changes in g. It would raise or lower
the curve, but not change its slope anywhere.
Figure 17 shows that the steep price increases of 1946 and
1947 were not expected to last; they did last, however. There
was some mild pessimism in the early 1950s, which was reversed in
1955; the better tone lasted through the early 60s, but then
became increasingly poor. Ever-worse price deterioration was
expected through 1970. Here the apprehension was justified,
since the real price kept dropping. But expectations grew less
bad in 1971-72, and then became practically neutral in 1973. The
poor expectations of 1974-79 indicated the industry did not
expect to keep all of its gains, but it is interesting that when
the price shot up in 1980-81, expectations were for further
increases. But the turnaround in prices did not lead to bad
price expectations. Interestingly, the price deterioration of
1985 improved g, and the 1986 collapse put it to an
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unprecedentally high level. In other words, the low 1986 price
was expected to turn around, and this was a correct forecast.
[Beninger & Arndt 1987] list 47 sales of oil and/or gas
properties between January 1986 and August 1987. Table VIII
shows the results of four ordinary least squares regressions,
with reserve values as determined by oil and gas reserves.
Neither a constant nor a time trend makes economic sense because
each is related to the total value of the property sold, hence a
distortion of any non-average property. An R2 of .98 indicates
very high heteroscedasticity. To adjust for it, we divide each
observation by the estiamted value of the property. In equation
4, the R2 is now only 0.22. The per-barrel values are now $5.80
per barrel and 82 cents per Mcf, and even more highly
significant. The estimated value per barrel is almost identical
with the Herold value for 1986. Nevertheless, the average
estimated value is 11 percent above the actual. Hence it is
plausible that a better estimate would be $5.22 per barrel and 74
cents per Mcf. It is interesting how little the gas estimate is
changed by the various estimating methods. The period was of
course, a highly disturbed one, but we are unable to see any
indications of this in the residuals pattern.
Reserve Values in late 1987 [Salomon 19881 have tabulated
sales of oil and gas reserves, of which 19 observations are
usable, for the months July-November 1987. (See Table VIIIB.)
Ordinary least squares regression, corrected for
heteroscedasticity, estimates the value at $4.34 per barrel,
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$0.74/Mcf. During this period, average market prices of oil and
gas were respectively about $16 and $1.80. (The spot price of
gas was lower, but the value of a developed reserve is determined
by the contracts in force rather than those which might be newly
made.) The oil value seems therefore to be on the low side, the
gas value on the high side, of the traditional 1/3 rule.
CONCLUSIONS
"Exhaustible resources" Since the whole earth is finite,
any mineral in it is finite, but we know not where the limits
are, and it would not matter if we did. We will never get to the
end of our oil resources. We will stop impounding them into
reserves when it no longer pays.
To treat the total of "economic" resources, i. e. those
worth producing, as a pre-fixed non-renewable stock, is circular
reasoning, assuming the conclusion. For in order to estimate
that amount we first need to estimate future costs and prices.
We might as well claim that there was a pre-fixed number of
buggy-whips to produce. In fact, the logistical curve is a good
description of a manufacturing industry, every one of which has
gone through a phase of accelerating then decelerating growth.
[Burns 1934]
Cost increases would be a sonar "ping" warning us we were
getting closer to the end, when it would no longer pay to find
and develop. The ping did not get any louder during 1945-73.
Development cost tended if anything to decrease, an indicator
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that discovery costs were not rising either. It roughly doubled
after 1973, returning to the 1955-62 level. Much but by no means
all of the increase is explained by the inefficiencies and waste
imposed by a more than threefold investment expansion in only
eight years.
We are left with a realization of how much reserves can
keep expanding literally decades after all the big fields are
found, and at no increase in real cost. That expansibility is
now being sorely tried.
Meyer, Woods, and others have drawn attention to the
estimates derived from discovery process models of very large
numbers of very small fields, relatively easily found, and
containing, in the aggregate, large amounts of oil. [Meyer and
Fleming 1985, and sources cited there. Woods 1985, GRI 1985.]
Smith and Paddock [1984] have been able to approximate discovery
decline curves in various provinces. A small difference in the
slope of the decline curve of field size makes a considerable
difference in the total area to be added. And both the height
and slope of the discovery curve depends on improved development
technology, which improves finding rates, because more new
fields are worth exploitation.
Cumulative depletion has its favorable side. Intensive
drilling and production have produced a dense network of pipe-
lines and infrastructure, which allows quick production, thereby
lowering cost. One sees a similar development in places like the
North Sea, where pipelines to shore were a major fraction of
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development cost, and remain to be used by newer smaller fields
as the older larger ones go into decline. Moreover, development
costs per drilling-production unit in 1000 feet of water have
dropped about three-fourths in ten years. [Petrie and Wright
1985]
In Alaska, Prudhoe Bay had about 25 billion barrels in
place, of which 10 billion became reserves. But overlaying
Prudhoe Bay are the West Sak and Ugnu formations containing
perhaps 70 billion barrels in place. [OGJ 1985b] If any of it
is developed into reserves--none has been--it will certainly be
much higher-cost oil than Prudhoe. On the other hand, the
Kuparuk waterflood promises one billion barrels for $445 million,
cheap in any league. [PIW 1985]
In mid-1987, a developed barrel of oil reserve in the
ground appeared to be worth about $4.50, while its cost was about
$3.00. On average, therefore, the industry is in no danger of
disappearing, nor even of drastic shrinkage. But a considerable
number of marginal deposits have lower value and higher cost, and
will be scratched. Moreover, if the pure resource value is
$1.50, one must question how much oil can be discovered at that
cost or less. Without new fields and pools to freshen the mix,
development costs must creep upward, though we cannot tell how
fast.
The collapse and recovery of oil prices in 1986-87 begins a
new chapter. For the first quarter of 1987, the number of rotary
rigs operating averaged 825, about half of the 1975 level. But
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the number of wells completed, and footage, were about equal to
1975, while prices in the $15-$20 range compared with $5-$12,
average $7.67. [DOE 1975]
Today, the better prospects look better than ever, at the
expense of a lot of poor or mediocre ones. It is reasonable to
expect a shrinking domestic industry at prices in the $15-$20
range, but we will hazard the guess that the decline will be
quite slow. The forecasts of the National Petroleum Council and
others [PIW October 1986], that production in and outside the
United States will shrink even as prices rise, may turn out to
be true, but as of now they have no foundation in fact.
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APPENDIX: COST CALCULATIONS
The objective of the calculations is to obtain the marginal
or incremental capital cost per barrel of oil or per mcf of gas
by investing in a new project.
Define: P = market price or supply price (see below).
i = market interest rate
K = capital expenditures.
R = reserves to be developed.
Q = initial or peak output
a = exponential decline rate
T = life of project
Taking i the discount rate as exogenous, we calculate P as supply
price or cost, the price at which the investment would be just
barely worth making.
Derivations
1) Reserves are cumulative production, declining exponentially:
R = Q ofT e-at dt = Q * l-e-a? [1]
a
For most values of a and T, the last expression
converges quickly to unity, and may usually but not always be
dropped.
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2) For a given investment, the Net Present Value:
NPV PQ e-(a+i)t dt - K = [3]
PQ * (1-e-(a+i)T) = K * (a+i)
Substituting [1] into this equation, and transposing:
P = K * a+i * (1-e- aT)
R a (1-e-(a+ i )T) [4]
For typical values of a, i, and T, the last fraction converges
quickly to unity, and may usually but not always be dropped.
or, P = (K/(Q/a)) * (a+i)/a = (K/Q) (a+i) [4a]
In words, the supply price is equal to the cost per unit
in-ground (K/R) multiplied by the adjustment for holding the
stock until produced, (a+i)/a = (1+ (i/a)); or to the investment
per annual barrel multiplied by the compound discount rate.
Alternatively, if the price is known, we solve for the
rate of return:
i = a*((PR/K)-1) [5]
or, i = PQ/K - a [5a]
Where T is known, find a by solving equation [1], but using
actual T instead of infinity. Then insert a and known T into
Equations [4] or [5], and solve alternatively for P or i.
Note: In the foregoing, we assume all capital
expenditures made at one time, in year zero. We assume peak
output initially, then an exponential decline.
In fact, capital expenditures stretch over several years,
usually peaking in or just before year zero, when production
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starts. Typically, production builds up over 2 - 3 years, then
holds approximately stable for a few more, then declines
steeply.
The errors are mutually offsetting. [Adelman & Paddock
(1980)] showed that for North Sea fields, the value of P calcula-
ted as above gave an excellent prediction of the values as
calculated from the actual production plans, tabulated by Wood
McKenzie.
The result of the Adelman-Paddock test is not surprising.
[McCray 1975] gives the following formula slightly adapted here
for calculating the expected decline period, which our short
method equates to infinity:
T = R * In (Qo/Qf )
Q0 -Qf
where T is the period in years, R = reserves = estimated
cumulative output, Qo = initial-year output, and Qf = final-year
output. Obviously when the final-year output is zero, the period
is infinite.
If T is finite, a is less, and the extreme right-hand
fraction of Equation [4] is less than unity. Hence the supply
price is less, and the return is higher, than would result from
our simpler use of the K/R * (a+i)/a approximation.
Consider proved reserves of 100, initial-year output of 10.
On the usual assumptions of infinite life, the depletion/decline
rate is taken at 10/100 = 0.1. Assume (K/R) = $1, and the
discount rate at 10 percent. Then by Equation [4], with the
final right-hand fraction converging to unity:
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P= K a+i = 12 = $2 i = [Pa/(K/R)]-a
R a
Alternatively: assuming that the market price P = $3, i
0.2.
Suppose we know, however, that final-year output is 2. then
we calculate:
T = 100 * In 5 = 12.5 * 1.6 = 20.1 years
10-2
If so, a decline rate of 8.0 percent per year yields cumulative
output of 99.96, and P = $1.85. Alternatively, if we assume a
market price of $3, then on the infinite-life assumption, the
rate of return is 20 percent. Setting T = 20.1 and a = .08, the
resulting i = 22 percent.
Thus our method, which assumes infinite time, understates
present value, and overstates cost by a factor of 9.2 percent.
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1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
o A + 8 o C
A = Development Cost per Barrel of Oil *
B = 6*Development Cost per Mcf of Natural Gas
C = Oil Price per Billion Barrels of Reserves Added
In this graph, the unit cost of gas has been multiplied
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FIGURE 13
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USA 1973-1986
COST
1973 1976 1979 1982 1985




















A COST0 GROSS P
FIGURE 15
VALUE IN GROUND AS PERCENT OF PRICE
CRUDE OL: USA 1946-1986
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Column 1, Drilling cost index:
1955-61: Adjustment of 1963 index (see below) using Gross National
Product Implicit Price Deflator, total for Gross Private Doestic
Investment on-Residential. The implicit price deflator and the
drilling cost index correlate closely for 1963-12.
1963-85: Independent Petroleu Association of America, Report of
Cost Study Coittee, twice annually. Cost index refers to
drilling and equipping wells.
1986: IPAA, change in jdgemental index from lay 1987 Report
of the Cost Study Coittee.
Column -8 Expenditures: see detailed calculation notes below
sources: 1955-72: Joint Association Survey




1955-T2: (total exploration expenditures) - (lease acquisition t
lease rental) exploration overhead
1973-82: ((total exploration expenditures) - (lease acquisition *
lease rental)) t ((gross expenditures drilling and
equipping exploration wells) / (net expenditures drilling
and equipping exploration wells))
1983-86: prior year's total exploration percent change in total
exploratory drilling (JAL)
Colun 3 Exploration Oil:
1955-56: (colun ) ( oil wells (development t exploration) /
(( oil t gas wells (development t exploration))
1959-T2: (colan 2) (total oil expenditures (exploration and
production) / (total oil gas expenditures (exploration
and development))
1913-82: (colun 2) t (gross expenditure drilling and equipping
exploration oil wells) / (gross expenditure drilling and
equipping exploration oil fgas wells)
1983-86: column t percent of oil exploration drilling in total
exploration drilling (JA)
Column 4 Exploration onassociated Gas:
colun - colun 3
Colun 5 Development Total:
1955-12: (total development expenditures) ((development t
production overhead) (total development expendi-
tures) / (total development production expenditures))
1973-82: ((total development expenditures) - (development
acquisitions)) t ((gross expenditures drilling and
equipping development wells) / (net expenditures drilling
and equipping development ells))
1983-86: prior year's total development t percent change in
development drilling (JA8)
SOURC:S: Table I (continued)
Column 6 Development Oil:
1955-5: (column 5) t ( oil wells (development exploration) /
((I oil + as wells (development exploration)
1959-72: (colun 5) t (total oil expenditures (exploration and
production) / (total oil + gas expenditures (exploration and
development))
1973-82: (colun 5) t (gross expenditure drilling and equipping
development oil wells) / (gross expenditure drilling and
equipping development oil + asn wells)
1913-86: prior ear's oil development percent change in oil
development drilling
Colun Development onassociated Ga:
column 5 - colmn S
TABLE II




RESERVES ADDED ' col 1)
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(1983




























































































































































































































Column 1,2, Reserve additions by Development
Oil: 1946-76: API/AGA op. cit. Table II adjusted for Alaska
(1970) using Table III-2.
1977-79: average of API/AGA data and Energy Information
Administration Annual U.S. ... Reserves.
1980-86: EIA figures.
Gas: 1945-59: Adelman, The Supply and Price of Natural Gas
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962) Table IV-B.
1960-65: Adelman methodology, see above.
1966-77: API/AGA op. cit. Table VIII.
1978-79: average of API/AGA and EIA figures.
1980-86: EIA op. cit.
Note: tables referenced are from sources given.
Note on Alaskan exclusion: Oil: only reserves discovered
in 1968 and developed in 1970 were excluded. Gas: backdated
discoveries include associated and nonassociated gas; therefore,
Alaska excluded in 1968. Developed reserve additions include only
nonassociated gas; therefore, no Alaskan exclusion made as nonasso-
ciated volumes are insignificant.
TABLE III



























































































































































































































































































































































1 2 5 6 1
SOURCES: Table III
Column 1,2 production / reserves
Oil: total U.S.: 1947-76: API/AGA, op. cit. Table II
1977-79: average of API/AGA and IA figures.
1980-84 IA op. cit.
Alaska: 1947-58: n.a. volumes are insignificant
1959-76: API/AGA, op. cit. Table III-2
1977-79: average of API/AGA and IA figures.
1980-86 IA op. cit.
Non-associated gas:
total U.S.: 1947-59: Adelman, The supply and Price of Natural Gas,
op. cit. Table IV-B.
1960-65: Adelman methodology; see above.
1966-76: API/AGA, op. cit. Table VIII.
1977-79: average of API/AGA and EIA op. cit. figures.
1980-86 IA op. cit.
Alaska:
reserves: 1947-58: n.a., volumes are insignificant
1980-86 IA op. cit.
production: 1947-58: n.a., volumes are insignificant
1959-76: API/AGA op. cit. Volume 32 Table II-3.
1977-78: average of API/AGA and EIA figures.
1979-86 EIA op. cit.
Hcf converted to boe by ratio (1 boe / 6.0 mcf).
Note: Tables referenced are from sources given.
Columns 5,6 American Association of Petroleum Geologists, annual
North American Drilling issues, later merged with World
Energy Developments issues; and Oil & Gas Journal.
Column 7 (columns 2 + 5 from Table I) / (number of rig-years)
number of rig-years, from Hughes Tool Co., reported in e. g.
Oil & Gas Journal, World Oil, etc.
TABLE IV











































































































































































































































































































Current price: 1918-1944 calculated from Crude Price Index,
Twentieth Century Petroleum Statistics,
Degolyer and MacNaughton, p. 98.
1945-1986, U.S. wellhead price from
EIA Annual Energy Review.
1986,
Deflator: 1918-1945, Long Term Economic Growth 1860
U.S. Department of Commerce, October 1966,
1945 - 1986 see column 7 Table II.
- 1965,
p. 200.
Reserve additions: 1918 - 1944 see column 1.
1945 - 1986 see column 7 Table ,II.
TiBL V
RBGUBSSIOI 1SULTS: DBEIIIAUTS OF RIBSIVIS ADDD
-------- IIDBPBID T VIABLIS---------
(CUE OUT- DRILLING
CUKULATIVE PUT)S(CUW FACTOR IOIIAL adj.
CONSTANT OUTPUT OUTPUT PU) PRICIS PRICE RSQ F-stat D-V
----------------------- LOGARITBIC QUAITIONS------------------------
3.69 -- -- -0.198 -- 0.156 8.24 1.14



























































-0.015 3.601-08 -34.7 139.1
0.4 0.21 3.45 4.01
-- -- -42.1 153.3
























PRODUCTION EXPENSES, TAXES, & ROYALTIES,


























































































































































1955-1975: Joint Association Survey, Part II
1975*, 1976-1982: Bureau of the Census, Annual Survey
of Oil & Gas.
1982*, 1983-1986: Department of Energy, Annual Energy Review.
Net Revenues:
1955-82: Gross Revenues minus royalties, production outlays,
and taxes, from J.A.S., 1955-1975; from Census,
1975t-1982.
Net royalties assumed 15 percent of gross revenues,
less royalties received by operators.
Net royalty averaged 12.7 percent 1955-1982, assumed
so for 1982*.
1983-85: Ratio of Net to Gross for 1981-82 used,
to account for Windfall Profits Tax in effect.
1986: Ratio for 1955-80 used, assuming that Windfall Profits
Tax not in effect due to fall in prices.
TABLE VII
WELLHEAD PRICE, COST, AND RESERVE VALUES
USA 1946-1987












































































































































































DEVELOPMENT COST LESS POST-




























































































REGRESSION RESULTS: SALES VALUE OF OIL/GAS PROPERTIES

























































Beninger & Arndt: Oil & Gas Journal, October 12, 1987.
Non-reserves assets excluded. Equation 4 formed by dividing
all terms in Equation 3 by estimated value of property sold.
See J. Kmenta, Elements of Econometrics (1984), p. 287,
to which my attention was drawn by Harindar DeSilva.
Salomon Brothers: Salomon Brothers, Petroleum Exploration















Gross Price: Table IV.
Net Price: Ratio Net to Gross, Table VI.




User Cost: Reserve Value minus Post-Tax Development Cost.
POST TAX COSTS:
The reduction in cost aims to capture the net advantage
of drilling for oil instead of buying. This is the result of the
tax advantage of charging off intangible drilling expenses. The
percentage depletion allowance, repealed for nearly all
properties in 1975, affected the value of a property, whether
obtained by buying or by drilling.
Intangible drilling costs are "between 60 and 70 percent
of the entire well cost". (Petroleum Production Handbook 1962,
page 38-22, repeated at page 44-11 of Petroleum Engineering
Handbook, 1987). however a special API tabulation released in
1985 showed intangibles as 34 percent in 1984. this discrepancy
is due to the fact that drilling and completion account for
only about 60 percent of total development cost including lease
equipment, pressure maintenance programs, etc. For the whole
period, therefore, development outlay post tax is reckoned at
83 percent of pre-tax, by the formula: X=1-(.34)(1-.5)=.83.
The net present value is 63 percent of the gross saving. This
is calculated by assuming that cost would otherwise be uniformly
charged off over 25 years, and discounting at 10 percent this
would be worth 0.367 of an immediate payment, i.e. 1-.367=.633.
Then 0.17(.63)=0.11, and development cost is reduced by 11 percent.
